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Abstract
Choosing an object from an array of similar objects is a task that people complete frequently
throughout their lives (e.g., choosing a can of soup from many cans of soup). Research has also
demonstrated that items in the middle of an array or scene are looked at more often and are more
likely to be chosen. This middle preference is surprisingly robust and widespread, having been
found in a wide range of perceptual-motor tasks. In a recent review of the literature, Bar-Hillel
(2015) proposes, among other things, that the middle preference is largely explained by the middle
item being easier to reach, either physically or mentally. We specifically evaluate Bar-Hillel’s
reachability explanation for choice in non-interactive situations in light of evidence showing an
effect of item valence on such choices. This leads us to conclude that the center-stage heuristic
account is a more plausible explanation of the middle preference.
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Introduction
A preference for items in the middle has consequences in many settings, including consumer
choices (Atalay, Bodur, & Rasolofoarison, 2012), the assessment of people (Raghubir &
Valenzuela, 2006), and responding to questionnaires (Bar-Hillel, 2015). Several
explanations of the middle preference have been proposed, including the idea that it is a
product of the central gaze bias (see Tatler, 2007), so that increased looking at central items
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increases their selection (Atalay et al., 2012), or because selecting the middle item somehow
requires the least mental eﬀort (Christenfeld, 1995). Another explanation is that people apply
a heuristic that speciﬁes that the best items are in the middle, and this inﬂuences their choice
when there is little other information to discriminate between the items (Valenzuela &
Raghubir, 2009).
A further explanation of the middle preference has recently been proposed by Bar-Hillel
(2015). Her review of the literature aims to solve apparently contradictory eﬀects of location
on choice, for both serial choice tasks (where all options are presented one after the other)
and simultaneous choice tasks (where all options are at view at the same time), by using a
small number of psychological principles. Bar-Hillel has to be commended for her extensive
work in this area (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 2011) and on her attempt to provide a parsimonious
explanation of the many ﬁndings in this growing body of research. Unfortunately,
however, we believe that the explanation she provides for the middle preference,
speciﬁcally when the items to choose from are presented simultaneously rather than
serially, is not compatible with a range of empirical data. For this reason, we felt
compelled to redress the balance and place alternative interpretations center-stage.
Bar-Hillel (p. 431) suggests that the middle preference for simultaneously presented items
is caused by up to three psychological processes: ‘‘(a) middle positions are more reachable in
perceptual-motor tasks, (b) they are more representative in mental choice tasks, and (c) they
are felt to be better hiding places in games of hide-and-seek.’’ Reachability in this sense
applies not only just the physical ease with which an item can be held (e.g., proximity and
time) but also the mental ease with which it comes to mind. Tasks where there might be an
element of ‘‘hide-and-seek’’ between the person who set the task and the respondent include
multiple-choice tests or interactive situations in which a participant wants to hide an object
from a competitor (e.g., Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2003; Falk, Falk, & Ayton, 2009). Our primary
concern is with the explanation provided by Bar-Hillel for the large number of studies
showing a middle preference and which have not involved any element of hide-and-seek or
diﬀerences in representativeness. For these studies, some of which were not included in her
review (e.g., Kreplin, Thoma, & Rodway, 2014; Li & Epley, 2009; Reutskaja, Nagel,
Camerer, & Rangel, 2011; Rodway, Schepman, & Lambert, 2012), the reachability
explanation does not appear to be compatible with the data.
Bar-Hillel accepts that there are some ﬁndings she cannot explain in terms of reachability,
such as the preference for the middle cubicles in a row of four toilet cubicles, when the left
cubicle would have been the easiest to reach (Christenfeld, 1995). Other ﬁndings that do not
appear explainable by reachability include the preference for the middle pen of three
equidistant marker pens (Shaw, Bergen, Brown, & Gallagher, 2000). The pens were
presented in a plastic case 600 wide and taped to a wall. If we assume the majority of the
109 participants were right-handed any diﬀerence in reachability would be very slight but it
would be in favor of the pen on the right, given the width of a person’s shoulders and the
position of their hand. Bar-Hillel also asserts that the middle is easiest to reach because it
reduces the likelihood of missing the pen compared to a pen on the edge. Contrary to Bar-
Hillel’s assertion, it is possible that it is more diﬃcult, physically, to take the middle pen due
to the proximity of the two surrounding pens (see also Jackson, Jackson, & Rosicky, 1995),
particularly if a person has large hands.
Reachability also does not appear to have played any role when selecting from items on a
screen or paper, including the preference found for the person in the middle of a photograph
of job candidates (Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2009), for artworks on a computer screen
(Kreplin et al., 2014), for pictures on paper (Rodway et al., 2012), for consumer items
online (Atalay et al., 2012; Reutskaja et al., 2011), when putting an ‘‘x’’ in one of three, or
2 i-Perception
four, circles (Christenfeld, 1995), and when checking a box that matched the layout of a
planogram (Atalay et al., 2012). For example, in Rodway et al.’s task, which involved
selecting one of ﬁve pictures arranged in a row, if there was any inﬂuence of reachability
then the rightmost picture might have been the easiest to choose given that all the participants
were right-handed. Moreover, in Reutskaja et al.’s (2011) study, when nine consumer items
were displayed in a 3 3 array on a computer screen, reachability does not seem to explain
why the item in the middle was 60% more likely to be chosen than similar items at other
locations. Finally, Atalay et al. presented products and planograms oﬀ-center, to the left or
right of the participant, but this did not inﬂuence the middle preference, showing that it
occurs even when the middle item is not the easiest to reach.
The other explanation of the middle preference, for which there is substantial evidence, is
the center-stage heuristic (Raghubir & Valenzuela, 2006). This is a decision heuristic
originating from the metacognitive belief that the best and most popular items are
positioned in the center, and which underlies the preference for middle options in a wide
range of circumstances (Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2009). Bar-Hillel states that she takes no
issue with this account or evidence, but suggests that reachability is a better explanation
because it is more parsimonious and makes clearer predictions. However, a crucial prediction
of the heuristic that the ‘‘best items are in the middle’’ is that it might no longer apply when
all of the items to choose from are clearly ‘‘bad’’ to the chooser (see Kreplin et al., 2014).
Experimental evidence convincingly supports this prediction.
The importance of the valence of the items for eliciting a middle preference was ﬁrst
demonstrated in the data of Li and Epley (2009), although it was not analyzed in their
study. We performed this analysis to further test the idea against data. When participants
were asked to choose a face or painting from three simultaneously displayed good faces or
good paintings, there was a signiﬁcant preference for choosing the middle item (pooled choice
numbers left to right: 26, 44, 27, 2 (2)¼ 6.33, p¼ .04). In contrast, for three simultaneously
displayed bad faces or bad paintings, there was no middle preference, but a signiﬁcant right
preference (pooled choices: 23, 28, 45, 2 (2)¼ 8.313, p¼ .02; our conversion from percentages
to numbers; our pooling and our analysis, based on data in Li and Epley, 2009, Table 1;
studies 2(a) and 2(b), simultaneous). The center-stage heuristic, but not reachability, would
predict the middle preference for the good items and not the bad items. Similarly, Kreplin
et al. (2014) only found a middle preference when the items (artworks) had a positive valence
and not a negative valence. Furthermore, an inﬂuence of valence was obtained by Rodway
et al. (2012), but in this case it was the valence of the decision that diﬀered rather than the
items, with participants asked either ‘‘which item do you prefer?’’ or ‘‘which item do you least
prefer?’’ The middle preference was only found for the ‘‘prefer?’’ decision and not the ‘‘least
prefer’’ decision. This suggests that when people are asked to consider the item they least like,
the center-stage heuristic, which speciﬁes the location of the best item, no longer applies and
the middle preference is eliminated. In contrast to the center-stage heuristic, it is not apparent
how physical or mental reachability, or other explanations such as visual salience, could
explain or predict these results.
We suggest that the results of Li and Epley (2009), and other studies showing a role of item
valence (e.g., Kreplin et al., 2014), seriously question the validity of the reachability account.
However, the center-stage heuristic may also require further speciﬁcation, as diﬀerent
processes might be involved, such as the ﬂanking items inﬂuencing the attractiveness of the
middle item (Rodway, Schepman, & Lambert, 2013), or a negative emotional code being
applied to items on the edge (see Scholtes, Dittrich, & Klauer, 2014). In addition, further
experiments to directly test the reachability and center-stage accounts can be conducted. For
instance, Bar-Hillel (p. 430) says that if Valenzuela and Raghubir’s (2009) participants had
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given a verbal response, rather than a motor response, then she would predict a preference for
the edge rather than a middle preference, but this critical experiment has not been carried out.
As suggested by a reviewer, it is also theoretically possible that in the majority of studies
physical reachability (with right-handers tending toward the right item) and mental
reachability (with western literate populations typically scanning from left to right) have
operated in opposing directions, and caused the middle item to be chosen as a
compromise. Although eye-tracking studies have shown that participants look ﬁrst at the
middle item (Atalay et al., 2012; Kreplin et al., 2014; see Tatler, 2007), this possibility could
be tested further either by using a cross-cultural sample, who typically read from left to right,
or with a population of left-handers. If a combination of physical and mental reachability
causes the middle preference, then a preference for the left item, rather than the middle,
would be predicted for left-handers.
We greatly admire and respect the detailed work that Bar-Hillel has completed on the
cause of location-based choice and welcome further debate on this issue. However, we believe
that Bar-Hillel’s explanation of the middle preference for simultaneously presented options is
not supported by the evidence. An explanation in terms of the ‘‘middle-is best’’ heuristic is
still persuasive and is better than the rest.
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